Abstract. We present a dynamical theory of a multi-agent market game, the so-called Minority Game (MG), based on crowds and anticrowds. The time-averaged version of the dynamical equations provides a quantitatively accurate, yet intuitively simple, explanation for the variation of the standard deviation ('volatility') in MG-like games. We demonstrate this for the basic MG, and the MG with stochastic strategies. The time-dependent equations themselves reproduce the essential dynamics of the MG. Agent-based games have great potential application in the study of fluctuations in financial markets. These fluctuations exhibit fascinating statistical properties [1] . Any realistic agent-based market models will necessarily be complex because of the need to incorporate real-world market factors. In reference [2] we present a discussion of such market games. In this paper we concern ourselves with the simple, yet non-trivial, Minority Game (MG) of Challet and Zhang [3, 4] which is the fundamental building block for our more realistic market games [2] . The MG comprises an odd number of agents N choosing repeatedly between option 0 (e.g. buy) and option 1 (e.g. sell). The winners are those in the minority group, e.g. sellers win if there is an excess of buyers. The outcome at each timestep represents the winning decision, 0 or 1. A common bit-string of the m most recent outcomes is made available to the agents at each time-step [5] . The agents randomly pick s strategies at the beginning of the game, with repetitions allowed -each strategy is a bit-string of length 2 m which predicts the next outcome for each of the 2 m possible histories. Agents reward successful strategies with a (virtual) point. At each turn of the basic MG, the agent uses her most successful strategy, i.e. the one with the most virtual points. Here we develop a dynamical theory for MG-like games based on the formation of crowds and anticrowds.
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The number of agents holding a particular combination of strategies can be written as a D × D × . . . (s terms) dimensional matrix Ω, where D is the total number of available strategies. For s = 2, this is simply a D × D matrix where the entry (i, j) represents the number of agents who picked strategy i and then j. The strategy labels are given by the decimal representation of the strategy plus unity, for example the strategy 0101 for m = 2 has strategy label a e-mail: michael.hart@physics.ox.ac.uk
5+1=6
. Ω is fixed at the beginning of the game ('quenched disorder') and can represent either the full strategy space or the reduced strategy space [3] , depending on the choice of D. Σ is another time-independent matrix, containing all the strategies in the required space in their binary form: Σ r,h+1 describes the prediction of strategy r given the history h (where h is the decimal corresponding to the m-bit binary history string).
We introduce a vector n(t): this contains the number of agents using each strategy at time t, in order of increasing strategy label. The vector S(t) contains the virtual score for each strategy at time t in order of increasing strategy label. The vector R (t) lists the strategy label in order of best-to-worst virtual points score at time t; if any strategies are tied in points then the strategy with the lower-value label is listed first. The vector ρ(t) shows the rank of the strategy listed in order of increasing strategy label at time t. Hence R(t) and ρ(t) can be found from S(t) using simple sort operations. The vector n(t) is the sum of two terms
Here n 0 (t) gives the number of agents using each strategy; however where any strategies are tied in virtual score, n 0 (t) assumes that the agent will use the strategy with the lower-value label by virtue of the definition of R(t). The term n d (t) accounts for tied strategies, and hence provides a correction to n 0 (t). n 0 (t) is given by
where:
and Bin r ,r = Bin r,r . The standard notation Bin represents the binary distribution. Note the condition Bin r ,r = Bin r,r which guarantees conservation of agents, as in the basic MG. The outcome parameter Υ (t) denotes which choice, 0 or 1, is the minority (and hence winning) decision at time t:
where Σ = 2Σ − 1. The history, i.e. bit-string of the m most recent outcomes, and the virtual scores of the strategies are updated as follows:
where H is the Heaviside function, and
Equations (1-6) are a set of time-dependent equations which reproduce the essential dynamics of the basic MG, and can be easily extended to describe MG generalizations. Iterating these equations is equivalent to running a numerical simulation, but is far easier and can even be done analytically. A slight difference may arise as a result of the method chosen for tie-breaking between strategies with equal virtual points: a numerical program will typically break this tie using a separate coin-toss for each agent, whereas the dynamical equations group together those agents using the same pair of strategies and then assign a proportion of that group to a particular strategy using a coin-toss. This difference is typically unimportant.
As an example of the implementation of these equations, consider a time t e during the following game: m = 2, s = 2 and N = 101 in the reduced strategy space, with a strategy configuration Ω and strategy score given as follows: 
Using these values for Ω and S(t e ) we can obtain values for n(t) and ultimately S(t e + 1). Ω and S(t e ) imply that
524288 , hence yielding n(t e ) when summed. (When two strategies are tied, agents holding these strategies each flip a coin to decide which strategy to use. The separate probabilities obtained for the allocation of agents between all tied strategies, when multiplied together, yield the probability p of this n d (t) being chosen.)
Suppose h(t e ) = 2, i.e. the last two minority groups were '1' then '0'. Hence Υ (t e ) = 0, h(t e + 1) = 0 and consequently
An expression for the time-averaged quantity called the 'volatility' (standard deviation of the number of agents choosing one particular group) can be easily found using the above formalism:
where ε(t) = [n(t)
T Σ] h(t)+1 and ε is the time-average of ε(t) from time t 1 to t 2 . Here t 1 and t 2 denote the time window over which the volatility is calculated. In the reduced strategy space [3] a similar quantity to this standard deviation can also be written down using our previously introduced (time-averaged) crowd-anticrowd framework [6] :
For a given run of the game σ MG = σ CA , however these quantities become quantitatively the same (within the limits of sample size) when averaged over initial configurations of strategies [6] . σ CA mirrors the semi-analytic approach introduced to motivate the time-independent crowd-anticrowd theory of reference [6] (see Fig. 1 of Ref. [6] ). Indeed, the dynamical equations can be linked more formally with our previous time-averaged approach [6] . Consider a simple example where no two strategies are tied in virtual points and there are an equal number of agents having each possible pairing of strategies (low m limit and reduced strategy space), i.e. all elements in Ω are equal and non-zero. It is then easy to show that n 0 (t) r reduces to n
; this is precisely the vector of the quantity n r introduced in reference [6] now written in order of increasing strategy label. If we allow for tied strategies, n d (t) will be non-zero thus reducing the size of large crowds and increasing the size of the smaller crowds (and hence anticrowds), thereby leading to a smaller standard deviation than if the effect of n d (t) had been neglected. We now turn to a comparison between the standard deviation or 'volatility' σ obtained from numerical sim- ulations and our (time-averaged) crowd-anticrowd theory. We start with the basic MG. Figure 1 shows the spread of numerical values for different numerical runs (open circles), the full crowd-anticrowd theoretical calculation (large solid circles) and various limiting analytic curves (solid lines) for which closed-form expressions were given reference [6] . Fuller details are provided in reference [6] . The time-averaged dynamics can be described using a quantity P (r =r) which represents the probability that any strategy r is the anti-correlated partner of strategy r [6] . To produce the limiting analytic curves in Figure 1 , P (r =r) is taken to be either a delta-function or a flat distribution. The full theory takes the relevant form of P (r =r) from the game. The agreement is very good, confirming that our theory captures the essential economics.
In a variant of the basic MG, agents pick which strategy to use stochastically at each timestep. Focusing on s = 2, numerical simulations [7] found that the largerthan-random σ in the 'crowded' regime (i.e. small m) becomes smaller-than-random when the strategy-picking rule is made increasingly stochastic. Our crowd-anticrowd theory provides a quantitative explanation of this effect. Let θ be the probability that the agent uses the worst of her s = 2 strategies. Figure 2 shows a comparison between numerical simulation (open circles) and analytic expressions (monotonically-decreasing solid lines) obtained using our crowd-anticrowd theory (full details are given in Ref. [8] ). These analytic expressions vary in their choice of P (r =r): the upper line σ delta in Figure 2 assumes a delta function while the lower line σ flat assumes a flat distribution. The theory agrees well in the range θ = 0 → 0.35 and provides a quantitative, yet physically intuitive, explanation for the previously unexplained transition in σ from larger-than-random to smaller-thanrandom as θ increases.
Above θ = 0.35, the numerical data tend to flatten off while the analytic expressions predict a decrease in σ as θ → 0.5. This is because the analytic theory averages out the fluctuations in strategy-use at each time-step. In reference [8] we showed how to correct this shortcoming of the analytic theory. Consider θ = 0.5; Figure 2 inset (a) shows the measured numerical distribution in σ for θ = 0.5, while inset (b) shows the result from the semianalytic procedure introduced in reference [8] . The two distributions are in good agreement. Note that the nonzero average (4.7 for N = 101, m = 2 and s = 2) for each distribution lies below the random coin-toss limit √ N/2. It is also possible to perform a fully analytic calculation of the average σ θ in the θ → 0.5 limit [8] ; this value (which is also 4.7 for N = 101, m = 2 and s = 2) is shown in Figure 2 .
In summary, we have demonstrated that the crowdanticrowd approach can be applied to explain many aspects of MG games, yielding both time-averaged and timedependent theories (see also Ref. [9] ).
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